A critical examination of Prince Edward County’s affordable housing strategy and whether taxpayers received the best possible return on their investment.
Affordable Accounting—or an Incomplete Accounting?
A recent guest editorial published in a local community newspaper asks whether the Prince Edward County Affordable Housing Corporation has spent public money wisely. It offers a largely sympathetic defence of the corporation’s record, emphasizing the difficulty of developing affordable housing, the environmental contamination discovered on two municipal properties, the value created through remediation and the financial constraints surrounding the proposed eight-unit building on Disraeli Street.
Those are legitimate considerations. Affordable housing is difficult to finance, contaminated land is expensive to prepare, construction costs have risen sharply, and no fair assessment should pretend otherwise. But a public accounting cannot end with explanations of why delivery has been difficult. It must also measure what has actually been delivered, how the projects changed, what public resources were committed, what opportunities were lost along the way and whether the housing now proposed will be affordable to the people the corporation was created to serve.
On those questions, the editorial is incomplete.
After approximately seven years, substantial public expenditures, transferred municipal land, federal seed funding, municipal advances, professional studies and repeated redesigns, the corporation had not completed a single occupied housing unit by the beginning of 2026.¹
That fact should not be treated as a footnote to the accounting. It is the central entry.
Visit the Prince Edward County Affordable Housing Corporation website to review their plans. https://www.pecahc.ca/governance-team
The Missing Measure: Homes Delivered
The editorial correctly observes that public and non-profit housing development requires expertise, patience, risk management and access to financing. It also notes that projects of this kind can take longer than a single municipal election cycle. But the relevant comparison is not between instant results and reasonable patience. The question is whether the amount of time, money, land and institutional effort committed has produced an acceptable housing outcome.
The Prince Edward County Affordable Housing Corporation was established to increase the local supply of affordable housing. Its audited financial statements continue to describe that as its central purpose.²
Yet by early 2026, neither the former Duke Dome site in Wellington nor the Disraeli Street property in Picton had produced an occupied unit. The Wellington site remained vacant after demolition and environmental work, while the smaller Disraeli proposal still depended on financing, construction and potentially further municipal assistance. The editorial discusses remediation, rezoning, appraisals, procurement, professional design work, financing negotiations and increases in land value. Those activities may be necessary and may create some public value, but they remain inputs.
The promised outcome was housing. An accounting that records the inputs while minimizing the absence of the outcome risks confusing activity with achievement.
The Funding Narrative Requires More Context
The editorial states that Council provided just over $900,000 in grants between 2018 and 2022 and that there has been no further municipal funding since the corporation returned approximately $290,000 associated with the properties.
That description may leave readers with the impression that the County’s financial involvement effectively ended in 2022. The audited record is more complicated.
At the end of 2024, the corporation reported that it owed the County $632,009 for services and expenses paid on its behalf. That amount had increased from approximately $535,095 in 2023 and $286,102 in 2022.²
These amounts may be repayable and should not automatically be characterized as permanent taxpayer losses. But they represent real municipal financial support and exposure.
The corporation’s business plan also refers to Council-authorized access to a $5-million repayable construction line of credit, with interest-only payments contemplated during construction.³
A loan is not a grant. A reimbursable advance is not necessarily a subsidy. But neither should be omitted from a complete account of public support.
The full picture should distinguish among:
- direct grants;
- municipal loans and credit facilities;
- County-paid expenses;
- transferred land;
- staff and administrative support;
- professional and consulting costs;
- waived or deferred charges;
- tax treatment; and
- contingent municipal obligations.
Only after those categories are disclosed can taxpayers understand the scale and nature of the public investment.
“Clean and Ready” May Overstate the Position
The editorial describes the two properties as clean, safe and ready for development and argues that remediation increased their combined value.
The environmental work may well have improved both properties. Removing unsafe structures, addressing contamination and preparing municipal land for future development can create legitimate public value.
However, the corporation’s audited statements described a less complete picture as of December 31, 2024.
The Wellington project was reported to be in the environmental-assessment and feasibility stage. No construction commitments had been entered into, and the commencement date, completion cost and financing remained undetermined.
Disraeli was similarly described as being in the feasibility stage, with no contractual construction commitments and with its timing, total cost and financing still unresolved.²
That does not mean the properties had no development potential. It means that “ready for development” should not be confused with funded, contracted and ready for construction.
The distinction matters because the editorial relies heavily on increased land values as evidence that public money was well managed.
An appraisal is not housing.
A rezoned property is not a completed home.
An increase in paper value may strengthen a balance sheet, but unless the land is successfully developed, transferred to a capable housing provider or used to secure completed affordable units, the community still has no one housed.
The Disraeli Project Has Become Smaller and Less Affordable
The changing scope of the Disraeli project deserves closer attention.
In 2021, federal seed funding was associated with a proposal involving approximately 20 affordable units. The County later announced plans for a 12-unit modular building, including bachelor and one-bedroom apartments, with rents beginning at approximately $620.⁴
By January 2026, the proposal had become an eight-unit building, reportedly containing four market units and four units at 80 per cent of market rent. The estimated project cost was approximately $2.8 million, and the financial model still showed a projected annual operating deficit.¹
Subsequent public reporting described a configuration of five market-rate units and three affordable units, together with a continuing funding shortfall and possible requests for further municipal assistance or waived connection charges.⁵
The editorial presents the market-rent component as necessary to make the project financially viable. That may be correct under the current business model. Mixed-income buildings are common, and revenue from market units can help support units offered below market.
But the project’s evolution is significant.
A property originally connected to a proposal for 20 affordable homes may now produce only eight apartments, of which three are described as affordable and five may be rented at market rates.
That is not a modest design adjustment. It represents a substantial reduction in the public housing outcome.
The important question is therefore not whether mixed-income housing can be financially defensible. It can.
The question is whether years of public investment, municipal land and accumulated project costs should culminate in a building where most units are market rent and only three are offered below market—and whether this represents the best outcome that could reasonably have been achieved.
Below Market Does Not Necessarily Mean Affordable
The editorial notes that affordable housing has multiple definitions and appears to apply a benchmark of approximately 80 per cent of average market rent.
That benchmark is commonly used in housing programs, but it can conceal the difference between a discounted apartment and one that is genuinely affordable to a low-income household.
If market rents rise rapidly, a unit priced at 80 per cent of market may still be beyond the means of someone receiving disability benefits, working in a low-wage local job, relying on a fixed pension or waiting for rent-geared-to-income housing.
The earlier 12-unit proposal contemplated rents ranging from approximately $620 for a bachelor apartment to $1,200 for a larger unit.⁴ The current financial discussion reportedly assumes much higher average rental revenue to support construction financing and building operations.
That may be necessary to produce a viable apartment project.
It does not necessarily produce housing for those experiencing the greatest need.
A complete public account should therefore disclose:
- the proposed rents for each unit;
- the household incomes those rents are intended to serve;
- the method used to define affordability;
- the period during which affordability will be protected;
- how rent increases will be governed;
- what happens when tenants leave;
- whether the market units will remain permanently at market rent; and
- how tenants will be selected.
Without those details, the word “affordable” can become a financing classification rather than a meaningful measure of whether local residents can pay the rent.
The Opportunity Cost the Editorial Does Not Address
The most important omission is opportunity cost.
Public money can be spent only once. Municipal land can be committed to only one strategy at a time. Years devoted to one development model are years during which alternatives may not be pursued.
The corporation’s 2024 audited statements reported approximately $822,542 in work-in-progress capital costs, including roughly $761,790 associated with Wellington and $60,752 with Disraeli. The corporation also incurred operating costs and accumulated substantial amounts owing to the municipality for expenses paid on its behalf.²
When grants, project costs, municipal advances, professional fees, staff support and the value of publicly contributed land are considered, the total public commitment is significant.
The missing question is what might have been accomplished had some of those resources been used differently when the corporation was established.
A decade ago, modest homes in Prince Edward County could often be purchased for a fraction of current prices. At historical County price levels, $1 million could potentially have acquired three or four modest houses, depending on their condition, location and the cost of renovations.
Those properties could have been placed in public or non-profit ownership, rented at deeply affordable rates, incorporated into a community land trust or converted into multiple units where zoning and building conditions permitted.
Direct acquisition would not have been effortless. Older houses require repairs. Scattered properties create operating and management costs. Purchasing existing homes does not increase total housing supply in the same way new construction does.
But it could have placed people in homes years earlier.
It could also have preserved permanently affordable housing before local real-estate prices rose dramatically.
Even if only three homes had been acquired, and each housed one family, that would already equal the number of affordable units now contemplated at Disraeli. If one or more of those properties could have been converted into two units, the outcome might have been greater.
Meanwhile, the current proposal appears to direct more than $2 million toward an eight-unit building containing only three below-market apartments.
That does not prove that property acquisition would necessarily have been the better strategy. It demonstrates why a proper accounting must compare the chosen approach with realistic alternatives.
The opportunity cost is not theoretical.
It consists of homes that might have been acquired, households that might already have been housed and purchasing power lost while local property values increased.
Land Appreciation Cuts Both Ways
The editorial argues that environmental work increased the value of the two properties by approximately $500,000 and that the land is now appraised at about $1.48 million.
That may represent genuine value creation.
But it also raises a strategic question.
Is the corporation primarily functioning as a housing provider, or has it become a land-remediation and development-preparation organization?
The corporation’s business plan contemplates preparing land, increasing its development readiness and potentially partnering with or transferring projects to other affordable-housing developers and operators.³ That may be a sensible role if the corporation does not possess the internal capacity to construct and operate housing independently.
But it is materially different from directly delivering completed affordable homes.
If land assembly, remediation, rezoning and partnership formation are the corporation’s principal functions, that mandate should be stated clearly. Its performance should then be measured by:
- completed land transactions;
- binding development partnerships;
- enforceable affordability covenants;
- firm construction dates;
- public value obtained from transferred land; and
- affordable units ultimately delivered.
Land appreciation can support future housing, but it cannot be treated as the final outcome of a housing strategy.
People cannot live in an appraisal.
The Financing Position Requires Clarification
The editorial states that the corporation has conducted a public procurement process, selected a modular builder, negotiated a construction arrangement and obtained financing, including financing for approximately 90 per cent of the project.
The public record has described a more complex and evolving financing picture.
Earlier reporting referred to potential long-term financing of approximately $2.5 million, an extended amortization period and a projected operating deficit. Later reporting indicated that a financing gap remained and that additional municipal support or waived charges might still be required.¹ ⁵
The corporation’s business plan separately describes a municipally authorized construction-credit facility at 2.5 per cent interest.³ That rate may relate to interim municipal construction financing rather than the permanent mortgage on the completed building.
Those are materially different forms of financing and should not be blended together.
Before construction proceeds, the public should receive a consolidated business case disclosing:
- the final construction price;
- the total project cost;
- the amount and source of each loan;
- whether each financing commitment is conditional or final;
- applicable interest rates;
- amortization periods;
- municipal guarantees or security;
- the value assigned to the land;
- grants and subsidies included in the capital stack;
- charges proposed to be waived or deferred;
- projected annual revenues;
- projected operating expenses;
- reserve requirements;
- anticipated annual surplus or deficit; and
- who will fund any shortfall.
Until these details are presented in one transparent document, it is premature to characterize the financing as fully resolved.
Volunteer Service Deserves Respect—Not Reduced Scrutiny
The editorial closes by praising the corporation’s volunteer board as energetic and experienced and by emphasizing its commitment to the County’s affordable-housing mandate.
Volunteer service deserves recognition. Board members may be acting sincerely, contributing considerable time and attempting to solve an extremely difficult problem.
But good intentions do not answer questions about performance, governance or value for money.
The corporation is publicly owned. It controls or benefits from public assets, relies on municipal resources and operates in response to an urgent community need. Its decisions therefore require meaningful scrutiny.
The issue is not whether individual directors are good people.
The issue is whether the delivery model works.
A board can be composed of capable and committed people while the organization itself struggles with unclear roles, changing project scopes, insufficient development capacity, weak performance measures or excessive dependence on municipal staff and consultants.
The corporation’s own business plan called for governance improvements, clearer responsibilities, performance indicators, stronger reporting and better communication.³ These priorities suggest that the organization itself recognized a need to strengthen accountability.
Respect for volunteers should never be used to lower the standards applied to public money.
What a Complete Accounting Should Contain
A complete public accounting should neither dismiss the corporation’s work nor defend it without qualification. It should place the relevant information in one transparent document.
For every project, the corporation should publish:
- the original number of proposed units;
- the original number of affordable units;
- the current number of market and affordable units;
- the original and current project budgets;
- all municipal grants received;
- provincial and federal funding received;
- municipal loans and credit facilities;
- County-paid expenses;
- professional, environmental, legal and design costs;
- staff support supplied by the municipality;
- land transferred and its appraised value;
- charges waived, deferred or under consideration;
- the final proposed rents;
- the definition and duration of affordability;
- projected operating surpluses or deficits;
- construction and occupancy dates;
- the number of households actually housed; and
- the full public cost per completed affordable unit.
It should also compare the selected strategy with credible alternatives, including:
- purchasing existing homes;
- partnering with established housing providers;
- community land trusts;
- rent supplements;
- secondary-suite incentives;
- acquisition and rehabilitation of small apartment buildings;
- converting appropriate municipal buildings;
- selling prepared land subject to binding affordability requirements; and
- direct municipal procurement of affordable units from private or non-profit developers.
This would allow Council and residents to assess not simply whether money was spent for legitimate purposes, but whether it produced the greatest reasonably available housing benefit.
The Question Is Not Whether Housing Development Is Difficult
The editorial is correct about one important point: housing development is difficult.
But difficulty is not a performance measure.
Public institutions are created to address difficult problems. When delivery takes seven years or more, the explanation cannot end with contamination, financing complexity, construction inflation and the good intentions of those involved.
Those factors may explain delay.
They do not establish value for money.
The Disraeli project may ultimately be completed, and three affordable apartments would unquestionably benefit three households. That would be better than another year of vacant land.
But the community is entitled to ask whether three below-market units within an eight-unit building represent an adequate return after years of public investment, transferred land, accumulated project costs and institutional effort.
It is also entitled to ask whether purchasing several modest homes years ago—when County real estate was substantially less expensive—could have housed an equal or greater number of people sooner while preserving those properties as permanently affordable assets.
Those questions are not hostile to affordable housing.
They are the questions affordable accounting requires.
The editorial offers a thoughtful defence of the process and of the challenges associated with developing housing. Those challenges are real and should be acknowledged.
Public accountability, however, requires more than explaining why a project has taken time. It requires measuring what has been achieved, what alternatives were available and whether public resources produced the greatest possible public benefit.
The community deserves not only an accounting of the effort.
It deserves an accounting of the results.
Sources
1. The Wellington Times, “Imminent?”, January 2026. Reporting on the proposed eight-unit Disraeli project, its estimated cost, unit mix, financing assumptions and anticipated operating position.
2. Prince Edward County Affordable Housing Corporation, Audited Financial Statements for the Year Ended December 31, 2024. Reporting work-in-progress capital costs, related-party amounts owing to the County and the development status of the Wellington and Disraeli properties.
3. Prince Edward County Affordable Housing Corporation, Business Plan 2025–2029. Describing the corporation’s mandate, governance priorities, municipal credit facility, project-development approach and potential partnership model.
4. Corporation of the County of Prince Edward, public announcement concerning the proposed Disraeli Street modular housing development, June 2023. Describing the earlier 12-unit proposal and anticipated rent levels.
5. Quinte News, County affordable-housing update, April 2026. Reporting the revised proposed mix of five market units and three affordable units and the continuing funding considerations.
6. Historical Prince Edward County residential sales and pricing information should be confirmed through authoritative local real-estate data before publication. The comparison concerning three or four homes is an illustration of opportunity cost and depends on the purchase date, property type, condition, closing costs and renovation requirements.
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Disclaimer: This commentary is based on publicly available financial statements, municipal documents, business plans and media reports. It is intended to examine public policy, governance and value for money. It does not allege misconduct by any director, volunteer, municipal employee or other individual. Figures may change as projects, financing and unit configurations evolve, and readers are encouraged to review the cited source documents.