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Council has rejected Prince Edward County’s water and wastewater financial strategy twice. Mayor Steve Ferguson is now considering using Ontario’s strong-mayor powers to keep it alive. With a municipal election underway, new provincial restrictions on mayoral powers in effect and approximately $255.5 million in contemplated borrowing associated with the strategy, the issue is no longer simply water and wastewater. It is also about how far one mayor should go to reverse the decision of a majority of Council.
Executive Summary: What Residents Need to Know
Q: What happened?
Prince Edward County Council rejected the water and wastewater financial strategy for a second time on September 8, this time by an 8-6 vote. Mayor Steve Ferguson subsequently announced that he is considering using Ontario’s strong-mayor powers to keep the strategy alive.
Q: Why is this such a significant decision?
The strategy is associated with approximately $255.5 million in contemplated municipal borrowing over the coming decade. Council was not voting to borrow or spend that entire amount immediately, but it was being asked to endorse a long-term financial framework behind one of the largest infrastructure programs contemplated by PEC.
Q: Can the Mayor simply veto Council’s 8-6 decision?
Not obviously. Ontario’s conventional strong-mayor veto applies to certain by-laws that Council has voted in favour of. Here, Council rejected the strategy. Ontario law contains a separate power allowing a strong mayor to propose certain by-laws that could advance provincial priorities such as housing and supporting infrastructure, but that is a different legal mechanism with different rules.[1][2]
Q: Why does the municipal election matter?
Ontario introduced additional restrictions in June 2026 governing certain strong-mayor powers during the election period. Where the prescribed conditions are met, including circumstances involving fewer than three-quarters of the outgoing Council returning, certain mayoral powers cannot be used to authorize expenditures or other liabilities exceeding $50,000, subject to specified exceptions.[3]
Q: Does that mean Mayor Ferguson cannot act?
Not necessarily. Much depends on precisely what he proposes. Continuing planning or directing staff to do further work may have a different legal effect from authorizing financing, agreements, expenditures or liabilities. Calling something a โstrategyโ does not determine its legal effect. The actual instrument does.
Q: What should happen before the Mayor acts?
County First believes the Mayor should publish the proposed by-law or decision, identify the precise provision of the Municipal Act being relied upon and release the County’s written legal analysis explaining how the proposed action complies with the election-period restrictions. There may be a lawful route forward. If there is, residents should be shown it before extraordinary powers are exercised.
Q: What about warnings that PEC could lose millions in government funding?
That could be a legitimate concern, but it should be quantified. Which grants are actually at risk? When do they expire? What municipal action is required to preserve them? How much additional spending would PEC have to undertake to receive them? A grant can make a necessary project cheaper; it does not by itself establish that the entire financial strategy is prudent.
Q: What is the democratic issue?
Council has debated the strategy, reconsidered it and rejected it twice. An 8-6 vote is not evidence of dysfunction merely because some people disagree with the result. Strong-mayor legislation provides extraordinary powers in specified circumstances, but using those powers to overcome a majority vote on a financial framework of this magnitude deserves exceptional scrutiny.
Q: What is County First’s position?
Mayor Ferguson should not use strong-mayor powers to reverse Council on this strategy unless the precise legal authority, proposed instrument and financial consequences are first made public. If urgent action really is required to protect government funding, that evidence should be released as well. Otherwise, the Mayor should improve the proposal until it can command majority support โ or allow the newly elected Council to decide.
The Details
Prince Edward County’s waterworks debate has changed.
For months, the argument centred on pipes, treatment plants, population forecasts, development charges and whether PEC could afford the enormous infrastructure investment being contemplated. After Council’s September 8 vote, however, another question has emerged: how far should a mayor go to overcome the decision of a majority of elected councillors?
Mayor Ferguson is entitled to believe Council made the wrong decision. His argument is substantial: PEC needs to plan for housing growth, infrastructure takes years to build, government funding could be endangered by delay and failing to provide servicing could ultimately increase costs for existing residents.
Those arguments deserve serious consideration.
But Council did consider them. It heard from senior staff, developers and representatives of the development industry. It reconsidered the strategy after an earlier rejection and then voted again.
Eight councillors remained unconvinced. Six supported proceeding.
That result matters.
The word โvetoโ may be misleading
Ontario’s strong-mayor legislation gives designated mayors significant additional authority, but there is no single unlimited power allowing a mayor to reverse anything Council decides.
The distinction is important in this case.
Section 284.11 of the Municipal Act provides a veto mechanism where Council has voted in favour of a by-law and the mayor believes that by-law could potentially interfere with a prescribed provincial priority. The legislation then establishes procedures allowing Council to attempt to override that veto.[1]
That is not what happened September 8.
Council did not approve the waterworks strategy and have the Mayor object to it. Council rejected the strategy.
There is consequently an important legal question about what exactly the Mayor would be โvetoing.โ
Ontario law does contain another strong-mayor mechanism that may be more relevant. Section 284.11.1 allows a mayor to propose certain by-laws that the mayor believes could potentially advance prescribed provincial priorities. Those priorities include housing and infrastructure supporting housing.[2][4]
Most remarkably, such a by-law can pass with the support of more than one-third of all members of Council, provided the statutory requirements are satisfied.[2]
In other words, provincial legislation can, in specified circumstances, allow a mayoral proposal to proceed without conventional majority support.
That is an extraordinary power.
And it makes what happened next particularly important.
Ontario restricted strong-mayor powers during the election period
In June 2026, Ontario enacted additional restrictions on certain strong-mayor powers during the municipal election period.
O. Reg. 189/26 addresses circumstances in which continuity between the outgoing and incoming Council falls below the prescribed threshold. Among its provisions are restrictions involving the use of the section 284.11.1 power where a proposed by-law would authorize an expenditure or โother liabilityโ exceeding $50,000, subject to exceptions including certain matters already included in the municipality’s most recent budget adopted before nomination day.[3]
PEC appears to have entered the relevant election-period situation because only a small minority of the current Council is assured of returning.
That does not automatically establish that Mayor Ferguson is prohibited from taking any action on the waterworks file.
It does mean the precise legal instrument matters enormously.
If the Mayor proposes merely to continue analysis or negotiations, one legal conclusion might follow. If the proposed instrument authorizes financing, agreements, expenditures or liabilities, a different analysis may be required.
The question therefore cannot be resolved by saying that Council is only approving a โstrategy.โ
The law is concerned with what the decision does, not merely what it is called.
Before exercising the power, publish the legal basis
This uncertainty has a remarkably simple solution.
Before using strong-mayor authority to revive a strategy Council has rejected twice, Mayor Ferguson should publish the proposed instrument and the legal authority supporting it.
Residents should be able to read exactly what the Mayor proposes to do.
The County should also obtain and release a written legal analysis addressing whether section 284.11 or section 284.11.1 is being relied upon, how the election-period restrictions apply, whether the proposed action authorizes an expenditure or other liability above $50,000 and whether any applicable budget exception is engaged.
There may be perfectly credible legal answers to those questions.
If there are, publish them.
That would turn speculation into facts and allow councillors and residents to evaluate the Mayor’s proposal on its actual legal foundation.
For a financial strategy associated with approximately $255.5 million in contemplated borrowing, that is not an unreasonable standard of transparency.
An 8-6 vote is not dysfunction
One of the more troubling arguments surrounding the latest vote is the suggestion that strong-mayor powers are needed because Council has become dysfunctional or โrecalcitrant.โ
Councillor John Hirsch was quoted after the vote describing a faction of Council as having opposed development for a long time and saying the situation demonstrated why the Province created strong-mayor powers.
That interpretation confuses disagreement with dysfunction.
Council heard the case for proceeding. Developers and the Quinte Home Builders Association argued that a financial framework was necessary to support development and negotiate upfront contributions. Senior County staff argued that long-term financial planning needed to continue. The Mayor warned about housing, infrastructure and government funding.
Council then voted.
Eight councillors said no.
Representative government does not become dysfunctional simply because the majority reaches a conclusion the Mayor, developers or provincial government may dislike. Sometimes the democratic process produces an inconvenient result.
The appropriate first response should be to understand why the proposal failed and determine whether it can be improved enough to win majority support.
The timing makes restraint particularly important
This would be controversial at any point in a Council term. It is considerably more consequential during an election.
Ontario’s decision to impose additional restrictions on strong-mayor authority during the election period reflects an obvious democratic concern: an outgoing Council should be cautious about making major decisions that could bind its successor.
PEC’s next Council will be chosen shortly. Many of the people voting on this strategy today may not be the people responsible for dealing with its consequences over the next four years.
That does not mean government must stop functioning during an election. Water plants still operate, contracts must still be administered and genuine emergencies cannot wait for a new Council.
But the larger and more enduring the decision, the stronger the argument for restraint.
A waterworks financing framework extending decades into the future sits near the top of that scale.
The $255.5-million number itself still needs explaining
There is another reason not to rush.
Shire Hall only recently provided a detailed response explaining why residents have been hearing dramatically different numbers for the waterworks program.
Staff’s September 9 explanation confirmed that the various figures do not all measure the same things. The $218-million โno-growthโ financing scenario, for example, includes approximately $118 million in projected costs, $39 million in completed costs, $19 million in lifecycle expenditures and $35 million associated with converting construction financing to long-term debt, with remaining differences involving inflation and completed studies.
Those may all be legitimate obligations.
But they are not all new infrastructure.
That distinction is important because Council is being asked to endorse a long-term financial direction at the same time residents are still trying to understand what the headline numbers actually represent.
Before extraordinary mayoral powers are considered, PEC should publish one consolidated reconciliation separating future physical construction, completed projects, lifecycle expenditures, studies and engineering, financing costs, existing-user requirements and growth-related requirements.
It should also show developer contributions already received, amounts contractually secured and amounts that remain dependent on future development occurring as forecast.
The strategy should become clearer before it becomes harder to reverse.
Government grants matter โ but show residents exactly what is at risk
Supporters of proceeding have also raised a legitimate concern about provincial and federal infrastructure funding.
Council was told that PEC has secured substantial provincial funding and has applications pending for additional federal support. The argument is that delay could jeopardize those contributions and ultimately leave ratepayers paying more.
If that risk is immediate, residents should see it.
For every grant said to be endangered, PEC should publish the amount, conditions, expiry date, municipal contribution required and specific Council action necessary to preserve it.
This is important because percentages can be misleading. A project described as โ85 per cent fundedโ in an initial phase may still be part of a much larger infrastructure program requiring substantial future municipal expenditures.
A grant is valuable because it reduces the cost of something PEC needs to build. It does not eliminate the need to establish whether PEC should build it, when it should build it and who should pay the remaining cost.
Developers have a legitimate voice โ but PEC needs greater lobbying transparency
The September 8 debate included representations from significant development interests, including the Quinte Home Builders Association, Cachet Homes, PEC Community Partners and Port Picton Homes.
They have every right to participate.
Infrastructure decisions directly affect whether their developments can proceed, and Council would be foolish not to understand their requirements and proposed contributions.
But the scale of the private interests affected by municipal infrastructure decisions is precisely why PEC should adopt a lobbyist registry.
Residents can see a developer who appears publicly as a deputation. They cannot necessarily see meetings, telephone calls or correspondence occurring outside the Council chamber between developers, consultants, senior staff, councillors and the Mayor.
There is no basis here to allege improper influence, and County First makes no such allegation. The issue is transparency.
When municipal decisions can create or protect substantial private development value while exposing the public to substantial financial commitments, residents should be able to see who is attempting to influence those decisions.
Growth can proceed without asking existing residents to speculate on it
None of this requires PEC to oppose development.
The County needs housing. It needs functioning water and wastewater infrastructure. Aging assets cannot simply be ignored because Council dislikes the price of replacing them.
But PEC already has the correct financing principle: growth should pay for growth.[5]
That means identifying what infrastructure existing customers genuinely require, calculating the additional infrastructure required because of development and recovering the incremental growth-related cost from development to the maximum extent lawfully possible.
PEC has already used upfront developer-financing arrangements in Wellington specifically to reduce municipal borrowing risk.[6]
That approach provides a possible way through the current impasse.
If Base31 requires additional capacity, determine its properly attributable share and secure it. If Port Picton requires capacity, do the same. Apply the same test to Cachet and every other major development.
Existing residents should finance the properly allocated cost of the system serving them. New development should finance the properly allocated additional cost it creates.
That is a much stronger financial safeguard than simply assuming future development-charge revenues will eventually arrive.
The Mayor has another option: persuade the majority
Strong-mayor legislation creates unusual circumstances because something can potentially be legally permissible while remaining politically unwise.
Mayor Ferguson can make a strong case for his preferred strategy without using extraordinary authority.
He can show councillors exactly which grants will disappear.
He can require staff to reconcile the conflicting infrastructure numbers.
He can negotiate stronger upfront developer commitments.
He can add the โoff rampsโ that some councillors say are missing.
He can separate unavoidable existing-system expenditures from infrastructure dependent upon future growth.
Then he can return to Council with a better proposal.
If two more councillors become convinced, the problem disappears.
That would produce something far more valuable than a technical victory under strong-mayor legislation: a waterworks strategy supported by a majority of the elected representatives who must explain it to residents.
A $255.5-million strategy should be able to survive a majority vote
The debate over PEC’s waterworks future is difficult precisely because both sides identify genuine risks.
Doing too little could leave PEC with failing infrastructure, insufficient capacity, lost government grants and inadequate housing. Doing too much too soon could leave existing ratepayers servicing debt for infrastructure built around growth assumptions that take decades to materialize.
Those competing risks deserve careful analysis.
They do not justify treating an 8-6 Council vote as an obstacle to be engineered around.
If urgent action is genuinely necessary before the election, Mayor Ferguson should demonstrate why. If strong-mayor legislation provides the necessary authority, the County should publish the legal reasoning. If millions of dollars in grants will otherwise disappear, publish the conditions and deadlines. If developers are prepared to finance the infrastructure their projects require, secure those commitments.
Then let Council reconsider the evidence.
If the case still cannot command majority support, the newly elected Council will shortly have the opportunity to decide.
Mayor Ferguson may ultimately possess a lawful mechanism to advance some version of the strategy despite Council’s opposition. County First does not suggest otherwise without seeing the proposed instrument and the County’s legal analysis.
But possessing an extraordinary power and deciding that it should be used are two different things.
A waterworks strategy intended to shape Prince Edward County for generations should be able to withstand financial scrutiny, legal scrutiny and democratic scrutiny.
It should also be able to survive a majority vote.
Sources and Notes
[1] Municipal Act, 2001, s. 284.11 โ Mayoral veto. The legislation establishes the strong-mayor veto mechanism in relation to qualifying by-laws voted in favour of by Council.
[2] Municipal Act, 2001, s. 284.11.1 โ Mayoral proposal of by-laws. This separate provision permits a strong mayor, subject to statutory conditions, to propose certain by-laws considered capable of advancing prescribed provincial priorities and establishes the applicable voting mechanism.
[3] O. Reg. 189/26. Ontario introduced restrictions affecting specified strong-mayor powers during the municipal election period, including restrictions concerning certain expenditures or other liabilities exceeding $50,000.
[4] O. Reg. 580/22 โ Provincial Priorities. Ontario’s prescribed priorities include housing and infrastructure supporting housing.
[5] Prince Edward County โ Managing Growth and Development. The County states that it follows the principle that โgrowth should pay for growthโ and describes development charges and other mechanisms used to finance growth-related capital.
[6] Prince Edward County โ Upfront Infrastructure Financing. PEC has previously used developer prepayment and financial-security mechanisms intended to reduce municipal borrowing and ratepayer exposure associated with growth infrastructure.
Legal and Editorial Notice
This article is commentary and analysis concerning matters of public interest, including municipal governance, infrastructure finance and Ontario’s strong-mayor legislation. It does not constitute a legal opinion and does not assert that Mayor Ferguson has acted unlawfully. At the time of publication, the reported position is that the Mayor is considering the use of strong-mayor powers. The legal validity and effect of any future action would depend upon the precise instrument adopted, its wording, the statutory authority invoked, the applicable municipal budget and the obligations created by that instrument.
County First’s position is that these questions should be answered publicly before extraordinary mayoral powers are exercised on a decision of this magnitude. References to developers, industry organizations, staff or elected officials do not allege improper influence, conflict of interest, bad faith or misconduct. County First will update this analysis if the Mayor or the County publishes a formal decision, proposed by-law, legal opinion or other documentation that materially changes the analysis.

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